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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Plaintiff's appeal is from the final judgment of Judge Roger
A. Livingston of the Third Circuit Court in and for Summit
County, State of Utah entered December 8, 1992, R. 270-74,
granting summary judgment for defendant-appellee and dismissing
plaintiff-appellant's complaint with prejudice.

An amended

notice of appeal was filed on December 17, 1992. R. 275-276.
This court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(d).

STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue presented in this matter is whether the trial
court was correct in holding that Section 2.3 of the contract
between the parties, which provides that the terms of the
contract supersede and control over any conflicting Board policy
or action, is invalid as an unlawful limitation on the Board's
legislative authority.1

Section 2.3 of the Master Contract provides the
following:
2.3 Agreement Supersedes Policy - In case of any
direct conflict between the express provisions of this agreement
and any Board of Education policy, practice, procedure, custom or
writing not incorporated in this agreement, this agreement shall
control.
- 1 -

The appropriate standard of review is correction of error.
Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, (Utah
1991).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes are referred to herein and are set
out verbatim below.

UCA S 34-20-7
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; and such employees
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities.

UCA S 53A-3-402(14)(a)
(a) A board shall make and enforce rules necessary for the
control and management of the district schools.
(b) All board rules and policies shall be in writing, filed,
and referenced for public access.

- 2 -

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Association commenced this action on behalf of two of
its members, part-time teachers who claim entitlement to health
insurance for the 1989-90 school year under the terms of a
contract entered by the Board and the Association.

The

Association seeks damages for the two teachers as well as
declaratory and injunctive relief.

The Board defended by

asserting that the two teachers in question elected to enter
individual contracts with the Board, the terms of which
specifically exclude them from insurance coverage.
The Association's complaint was filed in Third Judicial
District Court for Summit County on April 12, 1990. R. 2-19.
Following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment.

R. 35-37, 187-188. The Board also moved to have the

case transferred to Third Circuit Court.

R. 35-37.

The motion

to transfer was granted, and the case was transferred to the
Third Circuit Court on April 27, 1992. R. 219.

Following oral

argument on the two motions for summary judgment, R. 256, the
Court ordered on September 16, 1992 that the Board's motion for
summary judgment be granted, that the Association's motion be
denied, and accordingly dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
R. 257-58.

The Court entered written conclusions of law on

December 8, 1992. R. 270-74.

The Association's appeal followed.
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STATEMENT OP FACTS
On September 21, 1988 the Board and the Association entered
a two year agreement. R. 55-56 (ff 1, 3). The text of the
contract is found at R. 7-18 and R. 157-218. The contract
recognizes at Section 2.1 that "the Board has certain powers,
discretion and duties, that under the Constitution and Laws of
the State of Utah, may not be delegated, limited or abrogated by
agreement with any party . . .."

On June 27, 1989, the Board

adopted policy GCDA which provides that employees working less
than 25 hours per week are not eligible for health and accident
insurance coverage.

R. 109. A copy of Policy GCDA is included

in the appendix at A-2.
By letter dated June 28, 1989, the Board informed
Association member, Nancy Schulthess, that the Board had voted to
offer her a one year job share teaching position with the
District for the 1989-90 school year.

R. 108. A copy of the

letter is included in the appendix at A-3. The contract was
offered under the guidelines of the previously adopteid Policy
-* GCDA.

A copy of Policy GCDA was included with the June 28, 1989

letter.

R. 109.

Ms. Schulthess signed the June 28, 1989 letter with the copy
of Policy GCDA attached on June 30, 1989 indicating her
acceptance of the position.

R. 116.

On December 12, 1989 Ms.

Schulthess signed a one year job share contract for the 1989 to
- 4 -

1990 school year.

R. Ill, 116. A copy of the contract is

included in the appendix at A-4.
The contract between Ms. Schulthess and the Board
specifically provides that the Board and Ms. Schulthess are bound
by the rules and regulations as set forth in the policies and
procedures of the Board, as they may be amended from time to
time.

R. 111. Under the terms of her contract, Ms. Schulthess

agreed to work 20 hours per week.

R. 111.

Association member Margery Hadden was aware that Policy GCDA
was adopted on or about June 27, 1989. R. 139-140. Ms. Hadden
signed a one year, job share contract on December 15, 1989
providing for half-time employment during the 1989-90 school
year.

R. 113, 139-140. A copy of the contract is included in

the appendix at A-5.
The contracts between Ms. Hadden and the Board and Ms.
Schulthess and the Board specifically provide that the parties
are bound by the rules and regulations as set forth in the
policies and procedures of the District, as they may be amended
from time to time.

R. Ill, 113. Under the terms of Policy GCDA

the two part-time teachers are not entitled to insurance
benefits.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Association alleges that the Board is restricted in its
actions by the terms of the master contract.

It attempts to

enforce a provision of the master contract which states that if
the terms of the contract conflict with the Board's policies or
actions, the master contract prevails.

If binding, such a

contractual provision would be an unlawful limitation on the
Board's legislative and decision making authority.

The Board

cannot be precluded from amending its policies, adopting
additional policies or rescinding existing policies.

The Board

is statutorily required to make and enforce rules necessary for
the control and management of the district's schools, including
setting and maintaining a budget for the district, governing
employee wages and benefits, and many additional matters vital to
the operation of the district.

This Court has already held that

legislative bodies cannot delegate their authority, and Utah law
is clear that no agreement can lawfully supersede the board's
authority and duty to act.
The Utah Attorney General's office has also determined
stating that a board of education cannot subject modification of
its policies to the approval of a local teachers' association or
union.

An attempt to enter such an agreement is not be within

the legislative intent for the operation of local districts.

- 6 -

This court's decisions and the Utah Attorney General's
office have made clear that a board is free to modify and repeal
policies adopted by its predecessor boards. A school board
cannot bar itself or future board from adopting subsequent
resolutions which may alter earlier established policies.
Collective bargaining agreements, where allowed, may not include
delegation or surrender of a statutory duty.

The Association's

interpretation of the master contract would wrest from the board
its authority to make binding policies and to modify, amend, or
repeal its own policies.

This is clearly contrary to controlling

law.
The master contract itself recognizes that certain powers,
discretion and duties of the board may not be delegated, limited
or abrogated by agreement with any party.

The Association's

argument that collective bargaining agreements are enforceable
regardless of the substance of those agreements is not supported
by the Association's own agreement with the board.

Thus, to the

extent the master contract attempts to limit the decision making
authority of the Board, the master contract is unlawful.

In

addition, the cases relied upon by the Association are
distinguishable, and in fact support the very position opposed by
the Association in this appeal.
The Association also argues that Utah statutes allow the
Board to enter any contract, regardless of the terms of that
- 7 -

contract and regardless of whether or not it delegates or
abrogates the Board's authority.

However, the plain language of

UCA § 53-A-3-411(l) only limits the term of lawful agreements.
It does not in any way allow the Board to unlawfully delegate its
authority, and does not validate otherwise unlawful contracts.
Utah law allows individuals to contract directly with their
employer regardless of existing collective bargaining agreements.
The Association alleges that the Board is prohibited from
negotiating directly with the Association's individual members
because it claims the master contact supersedes those individual
negotiations and contracts.

UCA § 34-20-7 specifically provides

that while employees to have the right to bargain collectively,
they also have the right not to bargain collectively.

The two

members of the Association involved in this action both entered
into contracts expressly subject to the Board's policy GCDA,
which had been adopted prior to the time the individual contracts
were entered.

The teachers knew that those contracts did not

entitle them to any benefits and they chose to enter the
contracts with that clear understanding.

By doing so they

exercised their right to bargain with the Board individually.
They cannot now claim that those contracts are unenforceable due
to the existence of a master contract.
The Association argues extensively that collective
bargaining agreements are allowed under Utah law.
- 8 -

However, that

issue is not before this court.

The sole issue on appeal is

whether f 2.3 of the master contract is an invalid and lawful
limitation on the Board's legislative authority.

The court

should not and need not decide whether collective bargaining is
appropriate for public employees under Utah law. Regardless,
this court has already held that in the absence of exclusive
legislative language, statutes governing labor relations only
apply to private industry and not to the state or its
subdivisions.

This court has also declared that public employees

in this state generally have no collective bargaining rights.
Therefore, there is no statutory collective bargaining right for
public employees' associations in Utah.

The vast majority of

states hold that in the absence of such express statutory
authority public officials do not have authority to enter
collective bargaining agreements with public employees.
The law in Utah is clear that a board of education may not
delegate its decision making authority or restrict or limit its
authority through private agreement or through its own action.
The authority of subsequent boards of education may not be
limited by the actions of a prior board.

The Association's

interpretation of the master contract would prevent the Board
from acting pursuant to statutory direction and exercising its
legislative decision making authority to direct the affairs of
the district.

The Board would not be able to act to set or
- 9 -

direct its budget; or to negotiate and contract directly with its
employees.

The Board would be bound by the actions of prior

Boards, with no ability to act in the interests of the district
schools.

The Circuit Court was correct when it determined that f

2.3 of the master contract is an unlawful restriction on the
Board's authority and the judgment of the Circuit Court should be
affirmed.

ARGUMENT
The Association alleges that the Board is bound by the terms
of the master contract, and that if the terms of the contract
conflict with the Board's policies, the master contract prevails.
For the reasons stated below, the Circuit Court correctly
determined that this provision is an unlawful restriction on the
legislative authority of the Board and constitutes an unlawful
delegation and surrender of the Board's authority and
responsibility to govern the affairs of the District.

In

particular, the Association's interpretation of the master
contract denies the Board the right to control its own policies
regarding such vital matters as employee benefits and wages. The
Association's interpretation of the master contract would allow
one board to restrict the authority of a subsequently elected
board.

It would prevent the Board from setting and governing its

own budget, as required by statute.
- 10 -

It would also prevent the

Board from entering contracts directly with its own employees.
Assuming without admitting that collective bargaining agreements
are authorized under Utah law for public employee associations, a
review of the Association's arguments reveals that many if not
all of its cited authorities stand simply for the principal that
collective bargaining agreements should be allowed.

However, the

issue presented before the court in these proceedings is whether
the specific provision of the master contract taking rule making
authority away from the Board is an unlawful restriction on the
Board's legislatively-mandated authority to govern the affairs of
the district.

Clearly such restrictions are not allowed.

As an additional and independent basis for the Court's
decision to grant Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment, Utah
law expressly allows individuals to contract directly with their
employer regardless of any existing collective bargaining
agreement.

That is precisely what the Association's members have

done in this case.

Their contracts were made directly with the

District on an individual basis and are controlling.

The

individual contracts determine with certainty that the
Association's members, Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden, have no
rights to the disputed benefits.
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A.

The Board May Not Be Precluded From Adopting or
Amending Its Policies.

The Association has alleged that the Board should be bound
by the terms of the master contract, and that if the terms of the
master contract conflict with the Board's policies, the master
contract should prevail.

The Association cites § 2.3 of the

master contract entitled "Agreement Supersedes Policy".

Section

2.3 states:
In case of any direct conflict between the
express provisions of this agreement and any
Board of Education policy, practice,
procedure, custom or writing not incorporated
in this agreement, this Agreement shall
control. [Emphasis added.]
Under the Association's interpretation, this contractual
provision would prevent the Board from amending its policies
regarding benefits, compensation, personnel, termination and many
other essential matters, thus taking away the Board's ability to
properly and responsibly manage its affairs according to
statutory requirements and standards.

If binding, such a

contractual provision would be an unlawful limitation on the
Board's legislative authority.

The Board of Education cannot be

precluded from amending its policies, adopting additional
policies, or rescinding existing policies, as these
responsibilities have been specifically delegated to the Board by
statute.

UCA § 53A-3-402(14) issues a statutory mandate to the
- 12 -

Board to make and enforce rules necessary for the control and
management of the district schools.

In addition, the Board has

many other statutory duties and responsibilities.
3-402 generally.

See UCA § 53A-

As shown herein, no agreement can lawfully

supersede the Board's authority and duty to act.
The principle that a legislative body cannot delegate,
assign or restrict its decision making authority is set forth
clearly in Salt Lake City v. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 563
P.2d 786 (Utah 1977).

In that case, the state legislature

enacted the Firefighters Negotiation Act.

One provision of the

Act called for mandatory binding arbitration by an independent
panel if the municipality could not agree on contract terms with
its firefighters.

The court held that the legislature cannot

relinquish the decision making authority of the legislative body
to a private entity, in that case an arbitrator, especially when
the private entity is not accountable within the political
process.
The legislature may not surrender its
legislative authority to a body where the
public interest is subjected to the interest
of a group which may be antagonistic to the
public interest.
Id. at 789.
The court continued, stating that such delegation "is not
consistent with the constitutional exercise of political power
and a representative democracy."

Id.
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The court then broadened

its holding to apply generally to all those who have been elected
by a given constituency.
Although the old delegation doctrine has been
repudiated, there remains an underlying core
of validity, which requires those who have
been selected, by a given process, and from a
given constituency, retain the power to make
ultimate policy decisions and override
decisions made by others.
Salt Lake City. 563 P.2d at 790.
The Board is an elected body, representing the electorate
of the Park City School District.

It holds decision making and

policy making powers which cannot be delegated or restricted by
agreement with private entities such as the plaintiff.

Thus, the

provision of the master contract which purports to override all
conflicting Board policies is contrary to law and unenforceable.
The Association argues that the Salt Lake City case is
distinguishable from the present case because the master contract
"contains no provision delegating any portion of the Board's
legislative authority to PCEA, to an arbitrator, or to any other
body".

Brief of Appellant at 17. However, the Board does not

argue that this is a case involving delegation of responsibility
to an arbitration panel.

This is a case involving a contract

provision, which, if enforced, would constitute an absolute
surrender of the Board's legislatively delegated authority to
govern its affairs through the enactment, amendment and recision
of its policies.

If the authority to make decisions on such
- 14 -

matters cannot be delegated to another party, it certainly cannot
be surrendered or abdicated at the request of another party.
The Utah Attorney General's office has also interpreted the
Salt Lake City case to state specifically that a Board of
Education cannot subject modification of its policies to the
approval of a local teacher's association or union.

Utah Att'y

Gen. Op. No. 86-40, August 11, 1986. An attempt to enter such an
agreement would not be "within the legislative intent for
operation of local districts."

Id. at 1.

The opinion continued:

It is clear that local boards of education
have the power to make policy and pass
regulations. Making general policy for
operation of the school district is clearly
legislative in nature, and it is generally
held that where this legislative policy
making function is conferred upon a local
board, the board cannot delegate this
legislative power onto others. Antieu on
Local Governmental Law. Volume 3A, §30Q: 404;
Godbey v. Roosevelt School Dist., 131 Ariz.
13, 638 P.2d 235 (Ariz. App. 1981).

Thus, for a locally elected board to
authorize a particular policy to be changed,
altered or amended only by mutual agreement
or consent of a private group with no
responsibility to the public appears clearly
to be beyond the legal authority of the board
and contrary to the legislative intent for
the elected board alone to maintain
responsibility for and control of the
operation of the district. 73 C.J.S. Public
Administrative Law and Procedure, Section 92;
Allen v. Board of Educ., 120 Utah 556, 236
P.2d 756 (Utah 1951); Johnson v. State Tax
Comm'n. 17 Utah 2d 337, 411 P.2d 831 (Utah
- 15 -

1966); Salt Lake City v. Intfl Assfn of
Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786 (Utah 1977).
In my opinion, a policy which can only be altered or
amended by agreement or consent of a private group is
beyond the legal authority of the board, is contrary to
legislative intent, and is invalid to the extent such
consent or agreement must be obtained.
Id. at 3.
Thus, under Utah law an attempt by the Association to bind
the Board to a contract term which purports to supersede any
conflicting Board policy is invalid and unlawful.

The Board may

not delegate its ability to act in its legislative ceipacity.
That capacity includes the ability of the Board to at all times
adopt, amend or rescind its policies according to the best
interest of the district and its students.

UCA § 53A-3-402(14).

The Utah Supreme court and the Utah Attorney General's
opinion also make clear that a board is free to modify or repeal
policies adopted by prior boards of education for th€> district.
See Utah Att'y Gen. No. Op. 86-40, August 11, 1986 at 4.

A

school board cannot bar itself or future boards from adopting
subsequent resolutions which may alter earlier established
policies.

This is a well-established principle applicable to all

bodies with legislative powers.

In People's Advocate, Inc. v.

Superior Court, suit was brought to challenge a statutory
initiative measure adopted at a recent election.

Part of the

initiative sought to govern the content of future legislation.
- 16 -

In striking that provision of the initiative, the Court agreed
that:
[the provision] runs afoul of the familiar
principle of law that no legislative board, by
normal legislative enactment, may divest itself or
future boards of the power to enact legislation
within its competence. (City and County of San
Francisco v. Cooper. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 898, 929,
120 Cal. Rptr. 707, 534 P.2d 403; see also In re
Collie, supra, 38 Cal.2d at p. 398; French v.
Senate, supra, 146 Cal. at p. 608, 80 p. 1031.)
181 Cal. App.3d at 328, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 646-47.

The Court then

concluded that "neither house of the legislature may bind its own
hands or those of future legislatures by adopting rules not
capable of change." Id.
The courts in California again stated this well-established
rule of law in City and County of San Francisco v. Patterson, 202
Cal. App.3d 95, 248 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Cal. App. 1988).

In that

case, a proposed initiative ordinance would have barred future
boards of education from entering into real property leases for
greater than certain periods of time at less than certain values.
Suit was brought to prevent adoption and enforcement of the
proposed ordinance.

The plaintiffs argued that the people cannot

employ the initiative process to bind future boards, which the
Board itself cannot do.

The Court agreed with plaintiff's

reasoning, and cited Cooper. supra.
In City and County of San Francisco v. Cooper. (1975) 13
Cal.3d 898, 929, 120 Cal. Rptr. 707, 534 P.2d 403, the Board of
- 17 -

Education entered an agreement with a council of employee
representatives which was later adopted by resolution of the
Board.

The agreement and resolution included a provision which

purported to preclude the Board from subsequently revising or
altering any of the other provisions of the resolution without
approval of the employee representatives.

A taxpayer brought

suit to challenge the resolution, claiming inter alia that the
provision in question effected a delegation of the Board's
ultimate decision-making authority.

The Court agreed, stating:

It is a familiar principle of law that no
legislative board, by normal legislative
enactment, may divest itself or future boards of
the power to enact legislation within its
competence. [Citations omitted.] Thus, a school
board cannot, by resolution, bar itself or future
boards from adopting subsequent resolutions which
may alter earlier established policies. Yet the
portion of the resolution presently at issue
purports to effectuate just such a result; it
seeks to place all the terms of the present
resolution beyond the reach of future board
action, except as the certificated employee
council agrees to such future action. Under the
authorities cited above, such a provision cannot
stand.
Cooper, 534 P.2d at 423. As in Cooper and the other cases
relying on Cooper, the Association's interpretation of the master
contract is an attempt to prevent the Board from exercising its
ultimate decision-making authority.

Its interpretation would

prevent this Board and future boards from exercising that
authority to govern its affairs through the enactment, recision
- 18 -

and amendment of its own policies.

Such an interpretation bars

the Board from controlling benefits to its employees in light of
existing budget constraints.

The Board cannot be contractually

restricted from enforcing or implementing its policies.

To the

extent the master contract purports to restrict the Board's
decision making authority, it is unlawful.
In Raines v. Independent School Dist. No. 6, 796 P.2d 303
(Okla. 1990), the board of education entered a collective
bargaining agreement with the local education association.

The

agreement required that teacher grievances be submitted to
binding arbitration.

When a teacher attempted to implement the

arbitration provision, the board refused unless the arbitrator's
decision was only advisory.

The court held that a school board

may not negotiate a term in a collective bargaining agreement
which involves delegation of a statutory duty or surrender of
this duty vested in the board by statute.

Id. at 304.

See also,

Mindemann v. Independent School Dist. No. 6, 771 P.2d 996 (Okla.
1989) . Similarly, the Board in this case cannot relinquish its
authority and responsibility to enact and amend rules necessary
to govern the district.

By claiming that the master contract

supersedes all Board policies and actions, the Association takes
the position that the Board has contracted away its right to
exercise its decision making authority.

The ultimate effect of

the Utah Education Association's position is to wrest from the
- 19 -

Board its authority to make binding policies including the
authority to set and govern its own budget.

It also prevents the

Board from entering contracts directly with its own employees.
This is contrary to controlling law.
It is the responsibility of the party contracting with a
governmental body to be aware of the unlawful nature of attempted
delegation of authority.

The court in Miller v. School Dist. No.

470, 744 P.2d 865 (Kan. App. 1987) stated:
One who makes a contract with a municipal
corporation is bound to take notice of
limitations on its power to contract and also
of the power of the particular officer or
agency to make the contract. The municipal
corporation cannot in any manner bind itself
by any contract which is beyond the scope of
its powers, and all persons contracting with
the corporation are deemed to know its
limitations in this respect.
Id. at 869.

Thus, the Association is deemed to be on notice of

the unlawful nature of its attempt to restrict the Board's
authority through the master contract.2
That a board of education has authority to contract
directly with its employees is evident from the powers
statutorily granted to all local boards of education, as well as
from related statutes governing rights of a board's €>mployees.
UCA § 53A-3-411(l) states that "a local school board may enter
into a written employment contract for a term not to exceed five
years." The power to contract is granted under the statute, with
no restriction as to with whom the contract may be entered. In
addition, UCA § 53A-8-103(l) clearly contemplates a board
contracting directly with its educators, rather that only through
an anociation, when if states "a local school board shall, by
contract with its educators or their associations, ..." establish
termination procedures. Also, employees are empowered to
- 20 -

The Association relies heavily upon the Colorado case of
Littleton Educ. Assfn v. Arapaho County School Dist.. 191 Colo.
411, 553 P.2d 793 (Colo. 1976).

The Association believes that

this case provides authority to bind a board of education to the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement regardless of the
content of those terms. However, a complete reading of the
Colorado court's decision in Littleton demonstrates that
Littleton does not support the Association's position.

In fact,

just the opposite is true.
Littleton involved a collective bargaining agreement between
the local board of education and Littleton Education Association.
The agreement provided for submission of employment disputes to
an impartial fact finder.

The court upheld the agreement, but

not before clearly explaining that under the terms of the
agreement, the ultimate decisions regarding employment terms and
conditions remained exclusively with the Board even after the
collective bargaining agreement had been finalized:
And we also point out that the subject
agreement did not provide for binding
arbitration on the points of disagreement
when the negotiations broke down as involved
in Greeley Police Union v. City Council of
Greeley, Colo. 191 Colo. 419, 553 P.2d 790
(Colo. 1976). On the contrary, only the
services of an impartial fact finder are
provided for. The agreement specifically
contract either collectively or individually, pursuant to UCA §
34-20-7.
- 21 -

states that the fact finder's report " . . .
shall be advisory only . . .." If the
parties are still at an impasse after the
advisory report of the fact finder, the
agreement provides that " . . . the board has
the authority to make the final decision and
determination on all unresolved issues,
without further negotiation." (Emphasis
added.)
Littleton, 553 P.2d at 796.

It was at this point that the court

held the district bound by the terms of the agreement because:
Negotiations between an employer and employee
organization entered into voluntarily as in
this case, do not require the employer to
agree with the proposal submitted by
employees. Rather, the ultimate decisions
regarding employment terms and conditions
remain exclusively with the board. While the
employees1 influence is permitted and felt,
the control of decision making has not been
abrogated or delegated.
Id.
Thus, the court upheld the collective bargaining agreement
addressed in Littleton because the resolution dispute* provisions
required the services of an impartial fact finder whose
recommendations were only advisory.

As the court stated, if the

parties were then still at an impasse, the Board had the
authority to make the final decision and determination on the
unresolved issue, without further negotiation with the
association.

The court's reasoning makes clear that had the

board not retained its legislatively delegated authority to make
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the final decision in matters so important to its operation, the
agreement would not have been upheld.
Littleton is factually distinguished from the case at hand
because the master contract provision in this case does not
provide for the ultimate decision-making authority to rest with
the board of education; rather, the master contract purports to
usurp the board's authority to make such final decisions
regarding its governing policies and clearly abrogates the
control of the board's decision-making authority.

By arguing

that the master contract controls if in conflict with any Board
policy or action, the master contract would be an absolute bar to
any Board effort to regulate its affairs regarding employee
benefits, salary, personnel and many related matters.

Thus,

Littleton is not supportive of the Association's position in this
case.

It does support the position taken by Utah courts that

decision making authority may not be abrogated or delegated.
must remain in the Board.
upheld.

It

Agreements which so provide may be

Those which do not so provide are unlawful.

Interestingly, the Littleton court also expressly recognized
that collective bargaining agreements "must not conflict with
existing statutes concerning the governance of the state's school
system".

Id. at 797. The Park City master contract provision in

question would prevent the Board from exercising its authority
and statutory responsibility to make and enforce rules necessary
- 23 -

for the control and management of the District's schools. UCA §
53A-3-402(14).

Therefore, under Littleton, the master contract

provision cannot be enforced.
The Association also relies on Louisiana Teachers Assfn v.
Orleans Parish School Bd.. 303 So.2d 564 (La. App. 1974), which
concluded that a collective bargaining agreement was binding on
the district.

However, the court did not address the issue of

whether such an agreement may limit, delegate, or abrogate a
board's legislatively delegated authority.

In fact, the

agreement in that case was upheld for the very reason that
"inasmuch as the board has not surrendered any decision making
authority, we conclude there has been no unlawful delegation."
Id. at 568.

In that case there was no unlawful delegation and

for that reason the agreement was upheld.

The Louisiana case

simply holds that an agreement which does not unlawfully delegate
authority may be enforced.

This case does not support the

Association's argument because the master contract does
unlawfully delegate or restrict the Board's authority.
The law in Utah is clear that a board of education may not
delegate or abdicate its legislatively delegated decision making
authority, particularly where it is given direct responsibility
to adopt, amend and rescind policies and rules in its continuing
efforts to properly manage the District schools.

The primary

case relied upon by the Association in its argument to the
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contrary is in fact contrary to the Association's position.

It

should be noted that the master contract itself recognizes in
§2.1 that the Board has certain powers which cannot be
delegated, limited or abrogated by agreement.
2.1 Limitation of Board Powers - The Board
has certain powers, discretion and duties,
that under the constitution and laws of the
State of Utah, may not be delegated, limited
or abrogated by agreement with any party.
Accordingly, if any provision of this
agreement, or any application of this
agreement to any future coverage hereby shall
be found contrary to law, such provision or
application shall have effect only to the
extent permitted by law, but all other
provisions or applications of this agreement
shall continue in full force and effect.
The master contract itself recognizes that the Board has
duties and responsibilities which cannot be abrogated, delegated
or limited by agreement with other parties.

The Association's

argument that collective bargaining agreements are enforceable
regardless of the substance of those agreements is not supported
by the Association's own agreement negotiated with the Board.

To

the extent the master contract attempts to limit the decision
making authority of the Board through § 2.3, the master contract
is unlawful.
The Association also argues that UCA § 53A-3-411(l) allows
the Board to enter any contract, whether or not the contract
delegates or abrogates the Board's authority.

However, the plain

language of that section merely limits the term of lawful
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agreements.

It does not in anyway allow the Board to unlawfully

delegate its authority, and does not validate otherwise unlawful
contracts.

Therefore, the judgment of the Circuit Court should

therefore be affirmed.

B.

Utah Law Allows Individuals to Contract Directly
with Their Employer Regardless of Existing
Collective Bargaining Agreements.

The Association alleges that the Board is prohibited from
negotiating directly with the Association's individual members
because it claims the master contract supersedes those individual
negotiations and agreements.

However, Utah Code Ann. § 34-20-7

specifically provides that while employees do have a right to
bargain collectively in Utah, they also have the right not to
bargain collectively.
Employees shall have the right to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aide or
protection; and such employees shall also
have the right to refrain from any or all
such activities.
UCA § 34-20-7 (Emphasis added.)

Plaintiffs1 members Nancy

Schulthess and Margery Hadden voluntarily elected to contract
with the district directly and signed contracts with the Board
individually.

During the summer and fall of 1989, the plaintiff
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and the Board were renegotiating the master contract.
Specifically, the section regarding benefits was under
renegotiation.

While the contract was under renegotiation, both

Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden entered into contracts subject to
the Board's policy GCDA, which had been amended during the
negotiations and before the individual contracts were entered.
That policy specifically defined the benefits to which they were
entitled under their contracts with the Board.

These teachers

knew that under the contracts offered by the Board they were not
entitled to any benefits and they chose to enter the contracts
with that clear understanding.

By doing so they exercised their

right to bargain with the Board individually.

Regardless of what

they now claim in retrospect, the signed and executed contracts
between Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden and the Board are clear
evidence of their intent to contract individually with the Board.
They cannot now claim that those contracts are unenforceable.
The importance of an individual's right to contract with an
employer despite the existence of a collective bargaining
agreement is supported in Utah Att'y Gen. Op. No. 85-73, March
11, 1986.

There, the Attorney General states that the collective

bargaining process "is of great importance so long as it does not
infringe on an individual's right to work or communicate directly
with his employer,

id. at 3.

Again in 1988 the Utah Attorney

General issued a formal opinion, Utah Att'y Gen. Formal Op. 88- 27 -

002, June 13, 1988, affirming its previous position that an
employee's right to contract directly with his/her employer may
not be limited by law or by employee associations.
Unlike a majority of states, Utah is a right
to work state. Utah's right to work approach
is premised on a preference for free choices
of employees as opposed to mandatory union
membership. An important implication of
Utah's right to work status, as it effects
this opinion, is that the basic free choice
premise generally disfavors union exclusivity
rights which tend to reduce a worker's right
of choice.
Id. at 2.
The Attorney General's opinion also states that "the Utah
Constitutional declaration that all men [women] have a right to
acquire and protect property has been construed as including the
right to work . . . " citing Golding v. Shuback Optical Co., 93
Utah 32, 70 P.2d 871 (Utah 1937), and McGrew v. Industrial
Comm'n. 96 Utah 203, 85 P.2d 608 (Utah 1938).

Under Utah law,

employees have the right to directly contract with their
employers regardless of a prior collective bargaining agreement.
This is what these two teachers did.

They contacted with the

District with full knowledge that their contacts were subject to
the then-existing policy regarding benefits.

They cannot now

attempt a rescission of those individual contracts because they
find the terms less favorable than those in the collective
bargaining agreement.
- 28 -

C

The Right of Public Employees to Bargain
Collectively is not at Issue in this
Case.

The Association argues extensively that collective
bargaining agreements are or should be allowed under Utah law.
However, that issue is not before the court.

As stated in the

Association's brief, the specific issue is whether Paragraph 2.3
of the master contract is an invalid, unlawful limitation of the
Board's legislative authority.

Brief of Appellant at 1, 2. The

Court should not and need not decide whether collective
bargaining is appropriate for public employees in order to
address the issue presented.

However, the Utah Supreme Court has

clearly held that in the absence of exclusive legislative
language, statutes governing labor relations only apply to
private industry and not to the state or its subdivisions.
Westly v. Board of City Comm'rs of Salt Lake City Corp., 573 P.2d
1279 (Utah 1978).

In addition, the Utah Supreme Court has

declared that "public employees in this state generally have no
collective bargaining rights."

Pratt v. City Council of the City

of Riverton, 639 P.2d 172, 174 (Utah 1981), citing, Westly v.
Board of City Comm'rs of Salt Lake City Corp.. supra.

As stated

by the Utah Attorney General, "the clear implication is that
public employee labor relations are not subject to a special
labor code in Utah."
13, 1988, at 2.

Utah Att'y Gen. Formal Op. No. 88-002, June

Therefore, there is no statutory collective
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bargaining right for public employees associations in Utah.
Moreover, the great majority of states hold that in the absence
of express statutory authority public officials do not have
authority to enter collective bargaining agreements with public
employees.

Local 2238 AFSCME v. Stratton, 108 N.M. 163, 769 P.2d

76 (N.M. 1989).

The Association's extensive references to

legislation adopted in the 1993 Legislative Session is not
relevant.

The law applicable is the law in existence at the time

the case was decided in the Circuit Court.3

Therefore, the 1993

Legislative enactments have no bearing on this issue. Moreover,
as stated above, this issue is not before the court and should
not be addressed in this appeal.

CONCLUSION
The law in Utah is clear that a school board may not
delegate its decision making authority or restrict or limit its
authority in any way.

The Circuit Court was correct when it

determined that § 2.3 of the master contract is an unlawful

A statute cannot be given retroactive effect unless the
legislature expressly declares such an intent in the statute.
Washington Nat'l. Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Ass'n, 795 P.2d 665 (Utah
App. 1990); Matter of Disconnection of Certain Territory from
Highland City. 668 P.2d 544 (Utah 1983).
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restriction on the Board's authority, and therefore the judgment
of the Circuit Court should be affirmed.
DATED this

zc

day of July, 1993.

Respectfully Submitted,
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN

' Brinton R. Burbidge
Blake T. Ostler
Stuart F. Weed
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Stuart F. Weed, certify that on July $0\

1993 I served

four copies of the attached BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLEE upon
ROBERT H. CHANIN and JOHN M. WEST, Bredhoff & Kaiser, 1000
Connecticut Ave., N.W., Suite 1300 , Washington, D.C. 20036 AND
MICHAEL T. MCCOY, 875 East 5180 South, Murray, Utah

84107,

counsel for the appellant, in this matter by mailing them to him
by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the
following address:

ROBERT H. CHANIN
JOHN M. WEST
Bredhoff & Kaiser
1000 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Suite 1300
Washington, D.C. 20036
MICHAEL T. MCCOY
875 East 5180 South
Murray, Utah 84107

Brinton R. Burbidgt
Burbidge
Blake T. Ostler
Stuart F. Weed
Attorneys of Record
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PARK CITY EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

vs.

Civil No. 92 CV 0019
PARK CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Judge
Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court on cross Motions for Summary Judgment.
Defendant Park City School District filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and
Memorandum in support thereof. Plaintiff Park City Education Association responded
by filing its own Motion for Summary Judgment together with a joint memorandum in
opposition to Defendant's motion and memorandum in support of its own motion.
Defendant then filed a reply memorandum and the motions were submitted for
decision with a request for oral argument.

The Court heard arguments by counsel on both Motions on Tuesday, August 4,
1992. Plaintiff was represented by Robert G. Wing, attorney. Defendant was
represented by Brinton R. Burbidge, attorney. The Court, having reviewed the
memoranda in support of and in opposition to the respective Motions for Summary
Judgment, and having considered the arguments of counsel, makes the following
Findings and Conclusions of Law.
Plaintiff brought this action on behalf of two of its members who allege they
have incurred damages as a result of a dispute in entitlement to health insurance
coverage. The members are Nancy Shulthess and Margery Hadden. The Plaintiffs
claims in this matter center on the District's contractual obligations with Ms. Hadden
and Ms. Schulthess. The undisputed facts are clear that both of these individuals
entered into a specific contract with the Park City Board of Education for half-time
employment. Each contract contained the following provision incorporating and
binding the parties to District policies and procedures:
5.

The Board of Education is bound by the adopted
rules and regulations as stipulated in the policies and
procedures. As an employee, you also agree to be
bound by these rules and regulations as they may be
amended from time to time.

Ms. Hadden and Ms. Schulthess entered into their contracts with full knowledge and
notice of the terms of the policy affecting insurance coverage for half-time or part-time
employees. The Board of Education adopted the policy in question prior to Ms.
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Schulthess and Ms. Hadden signing their contracts and prior to the time they began
their half-time duties for the 1989-1990 school year. Prior to entering their contracts
with the District, each had notice of and/or received a copy of policy GCDA
determining entitlement to health and accident insurance coverage. Therefore, this
policy as well as all of the policies of the District became and were part of the
contracts between the Board of Education and Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden.
Therefore, they are bound by the terms of this policy and are not entitled to any
additional health or accident insurance benefits other than those provided for by that
policy. Because both teachers contracted for only 20 hours per week, they were not
eligible for health and accident insurance coverage under the terms of policy GCDA.
Plaintiff argues that the individual contracts between the two of its members and
the Board of Education are unenforceable because the members elected to have the
Plaintiff represent them in contract negotiations. Plaintiff then argues that the Board
of Education cannot negotiate directly with plaintiffs members and the two individual
contracts are therefore invalid. In support of its position, Plaintiff draws analogies to
the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") and its case law. However, there is no
reference in the master contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendant which can be
interpreted as incorporating the NLRA or its resultant case law. Also, the NLRA and
the Utah counterpart thereto are not binding upon the Defendant and do not restrict
the Defendant's direct negotiations with Plaintiffs members. Therefore, Plaintiffs
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claims that the individual contracts between the Board of Education and its members
are invalid is without merit.
Plaintiff also alleges that the Board of Education is prohibited from negotiating
directly with Plaintiffs individual members because those members have chosen to be
represented by the Plaintiff. However, UCA § 34-20-7 specifically provides that while
employees have a right to bargain collectively, they also have a right not to bargain
collectively. Individual employees may contract directly with a school district's board of
education. Plaintiffs members, Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden signed contracts with
the Board of Education individually. They knew that under the terms of their
contracts, they were not entitled to any benefits and they chose to enter the contracts
with that clear understanding. Regardless of what they now claim in retrospect, the
signed and executed contracts between Ms. Schulthess, Ms. Hadden, and the Board of
Education are clear evidence of the contract and agreement with the Board.
Plaintiff also argues that the master contract by its own terms takes precedence
over Board policies which conflict with the provisions of the master contract. Plaintiff
argues that policy GCDA cannot be binding upon its members because the master
contract conflicts with the policy. Such a contractual provision would prevent the
Board of Education from amending its policies regarding benefits, compensation,
personnel, termination, and many other provisions, thus taking away the Board's ability
to properly and responsibly manage its affairs according to statutory requirements and
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standards. Moreover, such a provision would be an unlawful limitation on the Board's
legislative authority. The Board of Education cannot be precluded from amending its
policies, adopting additional policies, or rescinding existing policies.
Therefore, the Court concludes that policy GCDA, regarding benefits for parttime employees of the Board of Education, was in force at the time that Ms.
Schulthess and Ms. Hadden entered their individual contracts with the Board.
Individual employees of the school district are bound by policies adopted by the Board
of Education. The contracts between Ms. Schulthess and Ms. Hadden and the Board
of Education are enforceable.
Thus, there being no genuine issues of material fact and it appearing that
Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment is denied and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted. This Court hereby ORDERS that the plaintiff Park City Education
Association's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied, defendant Park City School
District's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and plaintiffs Complaint is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, each party to bear its own costs.
DATED this

<jj^day of QtL&ef; 1992.

Adopted

June

2,,

1989

Policy Code GCDA
JOB SHARING

Job sharing is a voluntary program providing two or more employees the opportunity to share
one position. In cases where it is mutually advantageous to both the school district and
employees, a job-sharing arrangement may be implemented. Wages, fringe benefits, and all
other benefits shall be prorated on the basis of the time worked as a percent of a full-time
equivalent position. However, any employee contracted for less than 25 hours per week will not
be eligible for health and accident insurance coverage. Employees working less than full-time
will not receive credit for a step increase on the salary schedule the next school year.
Employees working at least one half-time F.T.E. will receive one full step every two years.
Teachers who job share should generally teach each day, either morning or afternoon. It will
not be deemed appropriate to adopt schedules which anticipate long absences of teachers; i.e.
extended vacations, or additional personal days. Whenever a sharing teacher is absent from
his/her work as per the pre-arranged schedule, a record of his/her absence will be maintained
by the principal's office and reported to the payroll office. AH absences will be recorded.
To assure an orderly process, an application must be submitted no later than the following dates:
January 15 - Written proposal submitted to principal for the position starting
at the beginning of the next school year. Each request is for one school year only.
If applicants are presently sharing a position, they will need to apply each year
for the continuation of the job-sharing position. All applicants for each position
must apply as a team.
February 7 - Written proposal with principal's recommendation submitted to
the superintendent of schools.
March - At the first regular Board of Education meeting the written proposal
with both the principal and superintendent's recommendation will be submitted
to the Board.
April 15 - Approval or rejection of written proposal by the Board of Education.
If a teacher decides he/she would like to share one position and can find another teacher already
within their school, they should contact their principal before January 15th. If a teacher
within their school is not interested in job sharing and one teacher would like to find another
teacher in a school within the district, or outside the district. Policy GCD and Policy GCI will be
followed.
Upon Board approval, each applicant must sign a job-share contract for the shared position.
Each applicant must agree to return to full-time status in the event one of the participants in a
shared job is unable to continue in the shared assignment. If a teacher on a job-share contract
is granted a leave of absence, the shared assignment becomes null and void. Each applicant for a
job-sharing position must be certified to teach those subjects/grade levels involved in the
shared job. If the teachers or the Board decide to discontinue the job-sharing position at the end
of a school year, and if there is no other comparable position available in the School District,
the Board will decide which of the two teachers to retain in accordance with the policies and
criteria set forth in the Reduction of Professional Staff Work Force Policy, adopted 9/13/88.
Time necessary for coordination of teaching assignment responsibilities shall be performed on
the job-sharing teachers' time and not the districts. When teachers have the responsibility for
the same students both teachers must attend parent/teacher conferences. Both members of
job-sharing team must attend all faculty meetings, in-service activities, and any other school
activity requiring other teachers attendance.
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Park City Schools
1250 Iron Horse Drive

P.O. Box 680310

Park City, Utah S4068

(801)649-9671

June 28, 1989

Mrs. Nancy Schulthess
P. O. Box 680741
Park City, Utah 84068
Dear Nancy:
Congratulations! The Park City Board of Education voted at their
June 27, 1989, Board Meeting to offer you a one year, job-share,
second grade teaching position at Parley's Park Elementary School
under the guidelines of the adopted Job Share Policy No. GCDA.
You will be issued a formal contract as soon as negotiations are
settled between P.C.E.A. and the Park City Board of Education.
You must be appropriately certified for the elementary level and a
copy of your certificate must be on file in the District Office by
August 1-5, 1989.
Sincerely,

Sandra Hall
Please sign ana
and/eturn
one copy
copy or
of this
letter.
feturn one
tnis iett<
Signature.

Date
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Park City Schools
1250 Iron Horse Drive

P.O. Box 680310

Park City, Utah S4068

(801)649-9671

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FOR CERTIFIED STAFF

One Year Job Share Contract
Nancy Schulthjfess
P. 0 . Box 680741
Park City, UT 84068
The Park City School District Board of Education and the undersigned employee hereby enter
into an employment contract for the 1989-90 school year based on the certified salary schedule
LANE: BS, STEP: 4, and a FULL-TIME EQUIVALENCY OF: 0.50. Attached is a 198990 salary schedule.
1.

The contract will be for the minimum 184 working days as adopted by the Board of
Education.

2.

In addition, you may be eligible for additional salary.

3.

In the event you have completed less than three (3) consecutive years with the Park City
School District, your status will be that of a provisional employee.

4.

This contract is void if a valid and appropriate Utah teaching certificate was not on file
by November 1, 1989.

5.

The Board of Education is bound by the adopted rules and regulations as stipulated in the
policies and procedures. As an employee, you also agree to be bound by these rules and
regulations as thevjnay be amended from time to time.

Attachment

i
Park City Board President

Employee
npioyee
(

<]

/•7-A7-F?

Date

|\
3>-
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Park. City Schools
'•;r$e Drives

0. Box 680310 Part; City, Utah W068 (801) 649-9671

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT FOR CERTIFIED STAf h

One Year Job Share Contract
Margery Hadden

520 Parkview Drive
Park City, ! IT 84060
The Park City School District Board of Education and the undersigned employee hereby enter
into an employment contract for the 1989-90 school year based on the certified salary schedule
LANE PS + 55, STEP: 7, and a FIJI L-T1ME EQUIVAi ENCY OFi 0,50 Mtached is a
" " ~*

1-..

- - - r - schedi He

T he contract will be for the minimum 184 working days as adopted by the Board of
Education,

2.

In addition, ) oi i may be eligible for additional salary.

3.

In the event you have completed less than three (3) consecutive years v
School District yot ir status will be that of a provisional employee.
This contract is void if a valid and appropriate Utah teaching certificate was not on file
by November I, 1989,

4.
5.

T he Board of Education is bound by the adopted rules and regulations as stipulated in the
policies and procedures. As an employee, you also agree to be bound by these rules and
regulations as they may be amended fi or i i time to time

/.

Attachrrfent

/?' J /

^ ^ ^ _ _

Park City Board President

MmdUik

Employe^/

Date

'

fl
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